Hintikka and Sandu's Independence-friendly logic ([5] and [6]) has traditionally been associated with extensive games of imperfect information. In this paper we set up a strategic framework for the evaluation of IF logic la Hintikka and Sandu. We show that the traditional semantic interpretation of IF logic can be characterized in terms of Nash equilibria. We note that moving to the strategic framework we get rid of IF semantic games that violate the principle of perfect recall. We explore the strategic framework by replacing the notion of Nash equilibrium by other solution concepts, that are inspired by weakly dominant strategies and iterated removal thereof, charting the expressive power of IF logic under the resulting semantics.
Introduction
Game theory has proven to be a tool capable of covering the essentials of established subjects in research areas such as logic, mathematics, linguistics and computer science. Game-theoretic concepts have also been proposed in cases where traditional machinery broke down. In this paper we will study the game theory that functions as a verificational framework for independence-friendly (IF) first-order logic, which is a generalization of standard first-order logic (FOL).
As a semantics used for evaluating FOL, Tarski semantics is well-known and widely agreed upon. Yet this semantics cannot be used to evaluate Hintikka and Sandu's IF first-order logic, see [1] . IF logic abstracts away from the Fregean assumption that syntactical scope and semantical dependence of quantifier-variable pairs coincides. That is, in an IF logical formula, if '∃x' is in the syntactical scope of '∀y', the variable x can be made semantically independent of y by means of the slash operator. To evaluate IF logical formulae, Hintikka and Sandu (in [5, 6] ) introduce the notion of a semantic evaluation game. The independency of two variables expressible in IF logic is typically reflected by the corresponding semantic evaluation game being of imperfect information. This is in contrast to the evaluation games related to first-order formulae, they are of perfect information. Truth of an FOL or IF formula is defined in terms of its semantic evaluation game. This semantics was coined game-theoretic semantics (GTS) by Hintikka. It has been noted in the literature ( [12] , [3] ) that some IF evaluation games violate the game-theoretic principle of perfect recall. In game theory, games without perfect recall have not been studied extensively, one of the reasons being that it is hard to understand what real-life situations they capture -put loosely, they are not 'playable'. Thereby also the playability of IF games is called into question.
In this paper, we set up a strategic game-theoretic framework in which IF games can be defined. We will see that truth of IF under GTS can be characterized in terms of Nash equilibria in the strategic framework. We observe that the playability issues, concerning perfect recall, evaporate in the strategic framework, yet we get so-called coordination problems in return.
We explore the strategic framework by replacing the notion of Nash equilibrium by other solution concepts. That is, we also define truth for IF logic in terms of weakly dominant strategies and iterated removal thereof. Naturally, changing semantics affects the truth conditions of IF formulae, a phenomenon we study in terms of the expressive power of IF logic w.r.t. the resulting semantics.
Section 2 recalls the basics of IF logic and GTS. In Section 3, we define the strategic framework and establish the connection between GTS and truth in terms of Nash equilibria. Sections 4 and 5 explore the notions of truth that result after replacing the Nash equilibrium solution concept by different ones, that are inspired by the game-theoretic notions of weak dominance and iterated removal of strategies in strategic games.
The formal results are mostly given without proof. We hope to make an extended version of this paper, containing full proofs, available soon.
IF logic and game-theoretic semantics
The program of quantifier independence, as founded by [4] and later [5] , is concerned with abstracting away from the Fregean assumption that the syntactical scope and binding of quantifiers in first-order logic coincide. The syntax of independence-friendly first-order logic as proposed by [5] extends FOL, in the sense that, for example, if
is a FOL sentence containing the n-ary predicate R, then
is an IF sentence, provided that X i ⊆ {x 1 , . . . , x i−1 }. The variable x i is intuitively meant to be independent of the variables in X i , although it appears under their syntactical scope.
Definition 1
In this paper FOL denotes the smallest set of first-order sentences, that are in prenex normal form and in which every variable is quantified exactly once. We will assume them being of the form
where Q i ∈ {∃, ∀}. If no confusion arises we will abbreviate any string of variables
The reader has noted that the language we call FOL is really a simple version of first-order logic. This simplification streamlines notation considerably when we define the IF language, without affecting the contention of this paper. Analogous to [5] we define the syntax of IF logic in terms of FOL, as follows. Since sentences in FOL are assumed to be as in (2) , sentences of IF will be of the form
In φ ∈ FOL containing the strings 'Q i x i ' and 'Q j x j ', variable x j depends on x i iff i < j. In IF this linear ordering of dependency is given up -the quantifiers of IF sentences are partially ordered. The first partially ordered quantifier, also known as Henkin quantifier, appeared in [4] . For later usage, we formalize variable dependence by means of a binary relation. To this end let the set Var(φ) = {x 1 , . . . , x n } denote the variables for the IF formula φ as in (3) 
Truth of an IF sentence is evaluated relative to a suitable model M = (D, I, p) in which we distinguish a domain D of objects; an interpretation function I, that determines the extension of relation symbols; and an assignment p that assigns an object from the domain D to each variable. [6] associate with every φ ∈ IF and suitable model M a semantic evaluation game g(φ, M). The game is played by two players, called E and A, that control the existential and universal quantifiers in φ. In g(φ, M) the players and quantifiers are associated through the player function P, that is the function such that P(∃) = E and P(∀) = A. Intuitively, g(φ, M) proceeds as follows:
g(R(x), M) has no moves; E receives payoff 1 ifd ∈ I(R), and −1 otherwise. A gets E's payoff times −1. The above rules regulate the behavior of the game g(φ, M). [6] do not provide a rigorous game-theoretic model for these games. However, the formal treatments provided in the literature all take an extensive stance towards these games, viz. [12, 9, 3] and [10] for a propositional variant. In this paper the game g(φ, M) -with a lowercase 'g' -denotes a Hintikka-Sandu style, extensive semantic game. In these games independence is modeled by means of information sets imposed on the histories of the game tree. We omit rigorous definitions, but illustrate the idea by means of the game tree of an IF sentence that reappears in our discussion below
evaluated on the model ({a, b}, =), depicted in Figure 1 . From a game-theoretic perspective, every node in a game tree corresponds to a history, and every leaf to a complete history. On every complete history the utility function of the players is defined. To say that two histories are in the same information set means that the player owning the set at hand cannot distinguish between the two histories while at it. As a consequence any pure strategy for this player prescribes only one action for all the histories in the information set.
We say that E has a winning strategy in g(φ, M) if there exists a strategy that guarantees an outcome of 1, against every strategy played by A; and a strategy is uniform with respect to the game's information sets, if it assigns to every information set in which E is to move exactly one object from the domain. Note that here and henceforth we consequently mean 'pure strategy' when speaking of 'strategy'. Truth under GTS is defined in terms of winning strategies.
Definition 3 Let φ ∈ IF and let M be a suitable model. Then define truth under GTS as follows: φ is true under GTS on M, denoted by M | = GTS φ, if E has a winning strategy in g(φ, M). φ is false under GTS on M, if A has a winning strategy in g(φ, M). φ is undetermined under GTS on M, if neither E nor A has a winning strategy in g(φ, M).
In the realm of IF semantic evaluation games, information sets only partition histories of equal length, cf. [10] . Pure strategies in IF semantic games therefore coincide with tuples of Skolem functions, as we know them from logic. We introduce Skolem functions by illustrative means. Let φ be as in (1), then its Skolemization looks like
where f i is a Skolem function, being a function of type D {x 1 ,...,x i−1 }\X i → D. [13] showed that the truth condition of every formula with partially ordered quantifiers can be expressed in the Σ 1 1 fragment of second-order logic. Later, the result, applied to IF, reappears in Sandu's and Hintikka's work (for references see [6] ) hinging on the fact that for φ as in (1)
since any tuple f 2 , . . . , f n witnessing the truth of φ's Skolemization is a winning strategy for E in g(φ, M) and the other way around, assuming the Axiom of Choice. For [6] it is the strategies that form the heart of the game-theoretic apparatus involved.
What is essential [about game-theoretic conceptualizations] is not the idea of competition, winning and losing. . . . What is essential is the notion of strategy. Game theory was born the moment John von Neumann formulated explicitly this notion.
Having read this, the thought occurs that defining IF evaluation games in a strategic way may be more in line with Sandu and Hintikka's thinking. In this paper we will set up such a strategic framework; discuss the 'playability' of IF games in this context; and start exploring the framework.
The issue of playability of IF games, mentioned above, arises when we actually want to play games for IF sentences φ. In a game for φ, the turn-taking is governed by φ's quantifier prefix and the epistemic qualities of the agents by φ's slash sets. However, defining the IF language, we took no special care that our formulas would give rise to playable games. In fact, it has been observed that certain IF sentences yield games that require agents with odd epistemic features. That is, games that violate the gametheoretic principles of perfect memory and action memory. Roughly speaking a game of imperfect information has perfect memory if a player learning something (in our context: a previous move), implies it knowing this piece of information for the rest of the game; and, a game has action memory if every player recalls at least it's own moves. We refer the reader to [11] for an elaborate treatment of perfect recall and IF games.
For the sake of illustration, consider the extensive game g(θ, ({a, b}, =)), with θ as in (4) . 1 It is the case that ({a, b}, =) | = GTS θ, since the tuple (play a, play a) is a winning strategy. But also we have it that the histories a and b are in E's information set indicating that these histories are indistinguishable for E. Thus, g(θ, ({a, b}, =)) lacks both perfect memory and action memory. The issue of the playability of g(θ, ({a, b}, =)) evolves around the question how E can understand that (play a, play a) is a winning strategy for E, despite the fact that she is uninformed at the intermediate stage. That is, E seems to forget her own move right after playing it! One explanation may be that E is allowed to decide beforehand on a strategy and consult it while playing the game, even if she is unsure about her own moves at the intermediary stage. (This explanation appears in [12] .) In particular, that (play a, play a) is a winning strategy can then be understood as follows: First E picks a, thereafter she is uncertain about what history she is actually in: a or b . By consulting here winning strategy, however, she derives that she actually is in a and not in b . The imperfect information evaporates! This explanation requires more game-theoretic structure -i.e., consulting of one's strategy -than present in its description and would imply a non-game-theoretic understanding of having imperfect information during the game.
Another explanation may be that E is an existential team, hence associating with every existential variable a member of the team. This would make g(θ, ({a, b}, =)) a two-player cooperative game. But then the very fact that θ holds on the model at stake suggests to be interpreted in such a way that the x 1 -player and the x 2 -player are allowed to settle on their strategies before the game. Again, no such event can be found in the definition of g(θ, ({a, b}, =)) and it seems such an event would violate the gametheoretic understanding of information sets. Because, for instance in g(θ, ({a, b}, =)) the second player in the E-team would really know the move of the first player.
Below we shall reduce the puzzle that arises with θ to the question how Nash equilibria are supposed to arise in strategic games. First we set up a strategic framework, in which the notion of Nash equilibrium and other solution concepts can be meaningfully employed.
Strategic framework for IF games
In this section we define IF games as strategic games. We characterize truth of IF under GTS in terms of Nash equilibria. Below we briefly introduce these ingredients componentwise and introduce some notation involved. Note that strings in IF are assumed to be as in (3) . All definitions below are restricted to this assumption, but can be generalized without much ado.
Players. The set N φ = {i | x i ∈ Var(φ)} contains the players. The set N φ conveys the strong connection between variables in φ and players in G(φ, M) . In fact, if V ⊆ Var(φ), then we will use N(V) = {i | x i ∈ V} to denote the set of players associated with the variables in V. Let E φ (A φ ) be the set of existentially (universally) quantified variables in φ. We have adopted the multi-player view on IF games here, mainly because it is the framework that is most open to generalizations with respect to, for instance, the utility functions. Moreover, it allows for smoother terminology.
Strategies. For x i ∈ Var(φ), define U i,φ ⊆ Var(φ) to be the set of variables on which
Manipulating strategies. Define a profile s in G(φ, M) as an object in (N(A φ )) , we call the profile completely existential (universal) . If no confusion arises we will drop as many of the terms as possible.
If s ∈ i∈N ′ S i,φ for some N ′ ⊆ N φ and {1, . . . , j} ∈ N ′ , then s 1,..., j denotes the strategy profile s containing only player 1 to j's strategies. We will often discuss player j changing strategies with respect to a strategy profile s. We write (s − j , t j ) to denote the profile that is the result of replacing s j by t j . If s ∈ i∈N ′ S i,φ and s 
Utility functions. Let i ∈ N φ . Then, i's utility function in G(φ, (D, I, p)) is defined over complete profiles s as follows: u i,φ,(D,I,p) (s) = c i if [s] ∈ I(R) −c i if [s] I(R),
where c i = 1 if i ∈ N(E φ ), and c i = −1 if i ∈ N(A φ ). As all utility functions of the players in N(E φ ) and N(A φ ), respectively, are equivalent and the models under consideration can be made up from the context we will simply denote them by u E and u A . Now that we switched from extensive to strategic semantic games, observe that the notion of winning strategy in extensive games has a respectable strategic counterpart: Nash equilibrium. We say that the strategy profileŝ is a Nash equilibrium in the strategic game G, if none of the players i gains from unilateral deviation (see also [8] ):
where s i is any other strategy for player i and u i is player i's utility function in G. The following lemma can also be understood as a proof of effective equivalence between g(φ, M) and G(φ, M).
Lemma 5 Let φ ∈ IF and let M be a suitable model. Then, the following are equivalent:
• M | = GTS φ.
• There exists a Nash equilibrium s in G(φ, M), such that u E
Technically this lemma is not deep. Yet it shows us that strategic games can account for truth of IF logic. In the strategic framework the playability issues concerning perfect recall, encountered in extensive IF games, evaporate simply because the strategic games ignore the inner structure of games defined by consecutive moves by the agents. By ignoring the inner structure of the game, also the epistemic states of the agentsi.e., their information sets -are ignored.
But the issue of playability pops up in the strategic framework under a different guise. Revisit the game G(θ, ({a, b}, =)). As is common usage in strategic games we draw its payoff matrix, see Table 1 . The puzzle induced by the truth of θ on ({a, b}, =) in extensive contexts appears in the strategic context as a coordination problem. There are two equally profitable Nash equilibria, but which one to choose, without possibility to coordinate? How to understand Nash equilibria is a problem central in game theory, see [8] .
In the upcoming two sections we explore semantic interpretations for IF logic that are motivated by solution concepts that are not subject to coordination problems.
Weak dominance semantics
In this section, we define a semantics based on the existence of weakly dominant strategies. Intuitively, a strategy is weakly dominant for a player if it outperforms any other strategy independently of the other players' strategic behavior.
Definition 6 Fix some IF game G(φ, M). Then,ŝ i is a weakly dominant strategy in G(φ, M) for player i, ifŝ i ∈ S i,φ and for every complete mixed profile s it is the case
We 
for at least one complete mixed profile r.
The notion of weak dominance we employ is weaker than the one usually adopted in game theory. For comparison we refer to [8] . We now come to our definition of truth in terms of weak dominance. Formally, our claim boils down to the claim that
Definition 7 Let φ ∈ IF and let M be a suitable model. Then we define truth of φ on M under weak dominance semantics (WDS) as follows M | = WDS φ iff in G(φ, M) there exists a complete existential profileŝ such that s i is a weakly dominant strategy for every i ∈ N(E
but not the other way around. Since it is the case that ({a, b}, =) | = GTS θ, but θ does not hold on this domain under WDS, see Table 1 . As an example of WDS observe, that, surprisingly, for any model M with more than one object in its domain it is the case that for τ = ∃x 1 ∃x 2 [x 1 = x 2 ]:
That τ is true under Tarski semantics is obvious. From Table 2 it becomes clear that τ is not true under WDS on the model with two objects {a, b}. Although player 2 has a weakly dominant strategy, player 1 has none. switches the object chosen by player 1.
In the remainder of this section we will characterize the truth-conditions of IF under WDS and see that very little is left of IF's Σ 1 1 -expressiveness it enjoyed under GTS. We show in Theorem 10 that truth under WDS can be expressed in a fragment of FOL (evaluated under Tarski semantics). Before we come to a rigorous formulation, let us classify an IF sentence φ's variables and characterize one of the resulting classes.
Recall that we defined the dependency relation of φ's variables as a binary relation B φ . The result of taking the transitive closure of B φ we denote B * φ . That is, (x i , x j ) ∈ B * φ iff there exists a chain z 0 , . . . , z m of variables in Var(φ) such that z 0 = x i , z m = x j , and for every t ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} it is the case that (z t , z t+1 ) ∈ B φ . Such a chain of variables z 0 , . . . , z m we will call a B φ -chain. Note that B * φ is irreflexive. For every variable x i ∈ Var(φ), partition Var(φ)\{x i } as follows:
We encountered U i,φ before, as it contains all variables seen by player i. W i,φ contains the variables that can (in)directly see x i . V i,φ is the set of all other variables in φ not containing x i . What is meant by 'seeing (in)directly' is pinpointed by the following lemma, that characterizes the variables in W i,φ . (3) and let M be a suitable model. Let W i,φ be defined as in (7) for some sentence φ and i ∈ N φ . Then, x j ∈ W i,φ iff i j and in G(φ, M) there exists a complete strategy profile s and a strategy t i ∈ S i such that
Lemma 8 Let φ ∈ IF be as in
Intuitively, W i,φ is the subset of Var(φ) consisting of variables that are sensitive to x i changing assignments. The lemma, interpreted the other way around, teaches that, if x j is not in W i,φ , for every strategy profile, player i changing strategies does affect the object assigned to x j . (6), (7) and (8), respectively. We also consider the set W
Theorem 9 Let φ ∈ IF as in (3) and let M be a suitable model. The sets U i,φ , W i,φ , V i,φ are defined as in
The strings of variables in these respective sets will be referred to by means of u,v,w, andw ′ . Then, in G(φ, M) player i ∈ N φ has a weakly dominant strategy iff
where
mapping from Var((i)) to Var((iv)), as follows
We will refer to the first-order formula in (9) as α i (φ).
Basically, α i (φ) states that if (i) there exists an assignment that satisfies R, (ii) player i changes the object assigned to x i , but (iii) the other players j play according to a Skolem function that is uniform with respect to what they can see (i.e., the objects assigned to the variables in U j,φ ), then (iv) there exists an object d i to assign to x 
Formula α(φ) being true on M is equivalent to every existential player i having a weakly dominant strategyŝ i in G(φ, M). Yet this does not guarantee that the existential players i playing according toŝ i will always get 1. For instance, in G(ψ, M) every existential player has a weakly dominant strategy, if ψ's relational symbol is false for every suitable tuple of objects from M's domain. However, playing according to it will always yield an outcome of −1. Truth of β(φ) is a sufficient and necessary condition for avoiding the latter situations. . We observed that τ is not true under WDS on any model M that has a domain with more than one object (see Table  2 ). On the assumption that player 1 knows 2 is rational, player 1 may infer that 2 plays s copy 2 , because playing this strategy is better for it than any other strategy. That is, s copy 2 is weakly dominant. After this inference, player 1 choosing a strategy in G(τ, M) then effectively boils down to it choosing a strategy in the game Table 3 . In this spirit, the following definition hard-wires the procedure of players calculating what other players will play. As such it bears strong similarity to the game-theoretic literature on iterated removal of dominated strategies, see [8] . 2 The result of this procedure P as applied to some IF game will be the game that is effectively played.
Definition 12
Let φ ∈ IF as in (3) and let M be a suitable model. Then, define
and
Finally, put the strategic evaluation game
This vehicle we employ to define a semantics 'on top' of WDS.
Definition 13
Let φ ∈ IF and let M be a suitable model. Then we define truth of φ on M under weak dominance semantics plus P as follows:
for every complete profileŝ it is the case that u E (ŝ) = 1.
We thus state the truth of an IF sentence φ on M in terms of the outcome of playing the game G P (φ, M) by players that are empowered to reason according to the procedure P. For instance, it is the case that ({a, b}, =) | = P WDS τ. First of all, note that, epistemically, player n needs to know nothing about the other players in order to pick a weakly dominated strategy, i.e., to act in accordance with P. Now, player n − 1 needs to know that player n is indeed rational in order for it to be rational to consider game G n (φ, M). In general, to explain why the players would execute P, one has to assume that every player i is rational and i knows that i + 1 knows that . . . knows that n is rational. Now, this is quite strong an assumption to make. Much stronger in any case than WDS' mere requirements that all the players are rational.
Secondly, we observe that for φ ∈ IF
but the converses do not hold, witnessing τ and θ on M = ({a, b}, =), respectively. Thirdly, in Theorem 14 we observe that the expressive power increases when switching from | = WDS to | = P WDS with respect to FOL. Also, we draw the conclusion from this theorem that every FOL formula behaves under WDS plus P as it does under Tarski semantics. What is the expressive power of IF logic under WDS plus P is left open. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we set up a strategic framework for IF semantic games, which are traditionally studied extensively. Naturally, by giving up the extensive structure that is traditionally given to IF games, we avoid conceptual issues that arise with the playability of IF games (i.e., lack of perfect recall). We observed that truth of IF logic under GTS can be characterized by the solution concept of Nash equilibrium. We saw that other issues arise in the strategic framework: how are players supposed to coordinate or, more eloquently, how are Nash equilibria supposed to arise?
We used the strategic framework to define to semantic interpretations for IF logic inspired by solution concepts related to weakly dominant strategies: | = WDS and | = P WDS . The former does not require any of the involved players to know anything about the other players. We showed that under | = WDS the expressive power of IF logic collapses to that of a fragment of first-order logic (under Tarski semantics). The epistemic demands of | = P WDS were seen to be higher than that of | = WDS . We showed that the expressive power of FOL (under Tarski 
